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Abstract
We introduce a setting for learning possibilistic
logic theories from defaults of the form “if alpha
then typically beta”. An important property of
our approach is that it is inherently able to handle
noisy and conflicting sets of defaults. Among oth-
ers, this allows us to learn possibilistic logic the-
ories from crowdsourced data and to approximate
propositional Markov logic networks using heuris-
tic MAP solvers. This short paper is an abridged
version of [Kuzˇelka et al., 2016].
1 Introduction
Structured information plays an increasingly important role
in applications such as information extraction, question an-
swering and robotics. With the notable exceptions of CYC
and WordNet, most of the knowledge bases that are used in
such applications have at least partially been obtained using
some form of crowdsourcing (e.g. Freebase, Wikidata, Con-
ceptNet). To date, such knowledge bases are mostly limited to
facts (e.g. Trump is the current president of the US) and sim-
ple taxonomic relationships (e.g. every president is a human).
One of the main barriers to crowdsourcing more complex do-
main theories is that most users are not trained in logic. This
is exacerbated by the fact that often (commonsense) domain
knowledge is easiest to formalize as defaults (e.g. birds typi-
cally fly), and, even for non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) ex-
perts, it can be challenging to formulate sets of default rules
without introducing inconsistencies (w.r.t. a given NMR se-
mantics) or unintended consequences.
In this paper, we propose a method for learning consistent
domain theories from crowdsourced examples of defaults and
non-defaults. Since these examples are provided by different
users, who may only have an intuitive understanding of the
semantics of defaults, together they will typically be inconsis-
tent. The problem we consider is to construct a set of defaults
which is consistent w.r.t. the System P semantics [Kraus et al.,
1990], and which entails as many of the given defaults and as
few of the non-defaults as possible. Taking advantage of the
relation between System P and possibilistic logic [Benferhat
et al., 1997], we treat this as a learning problem, in which we
need to select and stratify a set of propositional formulas.
2 Background: Possibilistic logic
A stratification of a propositional theory T is an ordered par-
tition of the set of formulas in T . A theory in possibilistic
logic [Dubois et al., 1994] is a set of formulas of the form
(α, λ), with α a propositional formula and λ ∈]0, 1] a cer-
tainty weight. These certainty weights are interpreted in a
purely ordinal fashion, hence a possibilistic logic theory is
essentially a stratification of a propositional theory. The strict
λ-cut Θλ of a possibilistic logic theory Θ is defined as Θλ ={α | (α, µ) ∈ Θ, µ > λ}. The inconsistency level inc(Θ) of
Θ is the lowest certainty level λ in [0, 1] for which the classi-
cal theory Θλ is consistent. An inconsistency-tolerant infer-
ence relation `poss for possibilistic logic can then be defined
as follows: Θ `poss α iff Θinc(Θ) |= α. We will write
(Θ, α) `poss β as an abbreviation for Θ ∪ {(α, 1)} `poss β.
It can be shown that Θ `poss (α, λ) can be decided by mak-
ing O(log2 k) calls to a SAT solver, with k the number of
certaintly levels in Θ [Lang, 2001].
3 Learning from Default Rules
In this section, we formally describe a new learning setting
for possibilistic logic called learning from default rules. We
assume a finite alphabet Σ is given. An example is a default
rule over Σ and a hypothesis is a possibilistic logic theory
over Σ. A hypothesis h predicts the class of an example e =
α |∼β by checking if h covers e, in the following sense.
Definition 1 (Covering). A hypothesis h ∈ H covers an ex-
ample e = α |∼β if (h, α) `poss β.
The hypothesis h predicts positive, i.e. h(α |∼β) = 1, iff h
covers e, and else predicts negative, i.e. h(α |∼β) = −1.
Example 1. Let us consider the following set of examples
S ={(bird ∧ antarctic |∼¬flies, 1), (bird |∼¬flies,−1)}
The following hypotheses over the alphabet {bird, flies,
antarctic} cover all positive and no negative examples:
h1 = {(bird, 1), (antarctic→ ¬flies, 1)}
h2 = {(flies, 0.5), (antarctic→ ¬flies, 1)}
h3 = {(antarctic→ ¬flies, 1)}
The learning task can be formally described as follows:
Given: A multi-set S which is an i.i.d. sample from a set
of default rules over a given finite alphabet Σ. Do: Learn
a possiblistic logic theory that covers all positive examples
and none of the negative examples in S. This definition as-
sumes that S is perfectly separable, i.e. it is possible to per-
fectly distinguish positive examples from negative examples.
In practice, we often relax this requirement, and instead aim
to find a theory that minimizes the training set error. Simi-
lar to learning in graphical models, this learning task can be
decomposed into parameter learning and structure learning.
In our context, the goal of parameter learning is to convert a
set of propositional formulas into a possibilistic logic theory,
while the goal of structure learning is to decide what that set
of propositional formulas should be.
Example 2. Let S = {(penguin |∼ bird, 1), (bird |∼ flies, 1),
(penguin |∼¬flies, 1), ( |∼ bird,−1), (bird |∼ penguin,−1)}
and T = {bird, flies, penguin,¬penguin ∨ ¬flies}. A strat-
ification of T which minimizes the training error on the
examples from S is T ∗ = {(bird, 0.25), (penguin, 0.25),
(flies, 0.5), (¬penguin ∨ ¬flies, 1)} which is equivalent
to T ∗∗ = {(flies, 0.5), (¬penguin ∨ ¬flies, 1)} because
inc(T ∗) = 0.25. Note that T ∗∗ correctly classifies all
examples except (penguin |∼ bird, 1).
Given a set of examples S, we write S+ = {α|(α, 1) ∈ S}
and S− = {α|(α,−1) ∈ S}). A stratification T ∗ of a theory
T is a separating stratification of S+ and S− if it covers all
examples from S+ and no examples from S−. Because ar-
bitrary stratifications can be chosen, there is substantial free-
dom to ensure that negative examples are not covered1. Un-
fortunately, the problem of finding a separating stratification
is computationally hard.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether a separating stratification ex-
ists for given T , S+ and S− is a ΣP2 -complete problem.
Another important parameter besides computational com-
plexity is sample complexity which can be determined using
the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension. Hence, we also
determine the VC of the set of possible stratifications of a
propositional theory. Let us write Strat(T ) for the set of all
stratifications of a theory T , and let Strat(k)(T ) be the set of
all stratifications with at most k levels. The following propo-
sition provides an upper bound for the VC dimension and can
be proved by bounding the cardinality of Strat(k)(T ).
Theorem 2. Let T be a set of n propositional formulas. Then
V C(Strat(k)(T )) ≤ n log2 k.
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on the VC di-
mension of stratifications with at most k levels.
Theorem 3. For every k, n, k ≤ n, there is a propositional
theory T consisting of n formulas such that
V C(Strat(k)(T )) ≥ 1
4
n(log2 k − 1).
4 Experiments with a Heuristic Algorithm
We implemented a heuristic algorithm, which combined
structure learning and parameter learning, and we evaluated
1Note that, as we show in [Kuzˇelka et al., 2016], to decide
whether a separating stratification exists it is not sufficient to com-
pute the Z-ranking because of the presence of negative examples.
it in two different applications: learning of domain theories
from crowdsourced default rules and approximating MAP in-
ference in propositional Markov logic networks. As we are
not aware of any existing methods that can learn a consistent
logical theory from a set of noisy defaults, there are no base-
line methods to which our method can directly be compared.
However, if we fix a target literal l, we can train standard
classifiers to predict for each propositional context α whether
the default α |∼ l holds. This can only be done consistently
with “parallel” rules, where the literals in the consequent do
not appear in antecedents. We thus compared our method to
three traditional classifiers on two crowdsourced datasets of
parallel rules. In the second experiment, approximating MAP
inference, we did not restrict ourselves to parallel rules. In
this case, only our method can guarantee that the predicted
defaults will be consistent. This would also be the case if we
did not ask the crowdsourcers only about “parallel” rules. The
experimental results and details of the methodology are de-
scribed in the full version of this paper [Kuzˇelka et al., 2016].
5 Future Work
There are several important directions for future work. Al-
though our implementation is capable of working with tens
of thousands of defaults, it still does not scale to datasets of
the sizes of knowledge bases such as FreeBase. Scalability
is therefore an important issue. Also while possibilistic logic
is a natural choice for representing the learned default rule
theory, the framework of learning from default rules, which
we introduced here, could as well work with other represen-
tations of default rules which might be more suitable for cer-
tain domains. On the applications side, it would be interest-
ing to apply the method to learning from symtoms and diag-
noses/treatments.
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